Texas A&M Journal of Property
Law
Volume 4
Number 3 Symposium Edition - New Water
Symposium

Article 1

2018

Rainwater Harvesting in Colorado and the Quandary of a Taking
Stephen N. Bretsen
Wheaton College, stephen.bretsen@wheaton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/journal-of-property-law
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen N. Bretsen, Rainwater Harvesting in Colorado and the Quandary of a Taking, 4 Tex. A&M J. Prop.
L. 165 (2018).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V4.I3.1

This Symposia Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Texas A&M Journal of Property Law by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law
Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-3\TWR304.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

RAINWATER HARVESTING IN COLORADO
QUANDARY OF A TAKING

19-JAN-18

12:43

AND THE

Stephen N. Bretsen†
ABSTRACT
Although rainwater harvesting would appear to be a win-win solution to the
problem of developing new sources of water, implementing rainwater harvesting in the American West has been fraught with tensions that have pitted rural
farmers and other agricultural interests against urban and suburban homeowners. The water law of the western states is based on the prior appropriation doctrine, which creates a “first in time, first in right” system of water
rights tied to when a user diverts surface water for beneficial use. Since water
rights are property rights, state statutes and regulations that “go too far” in
affecting them risk giving senior appropriators a takings claim. Based on the
nature of rainwater harvesting and judicial interpretations of federal and state
constitutional takings clauses, the most likely claims by downstream agricultural irrigators in the West are that state statutes authorizing rainwater harvesting are per se physical takings. Such takings require compensation, even
though they do not result in the total loss of the right to use water or have a
minimal economic impact on a senior appropriator. To avoid a taking, state
legislatures need to draft these statutes in ways that take advantage of how
existing state laws implement the prior appropriation doctrine. Colorado’s
most recent rainwater harvesting statute leverages how the no-injury requirement placed on junior appropriators ultimately limits the scope of the senior
appropriators’ water rights and avoids a taking.
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INTRODUCTION
One source of “new” water is an ancient one—capturing rain and
storing it for later use.1 During a time when the planet is becoming
hotter, drier, and more crowded, rainwater harvesting provides a
† Stephen Bretsen is the William Volkman Associate Professor of Business and
Law at Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois. He is grateful for the research assistance provided by Ellen Misloski.
1. See Troy L. Payne & Jane Neuman, Remembering Rain, 37 ENVTL. L. 105, 121
(2007).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V4.I3.1
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means of conserving water before it disappears as runoff using simple,
relatively low cost methods and materials.2 Rainwater harvesting has
the potential to be the greenest of green practices because it allows a
locally produced natural resource to be locally consumed while reducing the dependence of building owners and occupants on public
utilities.
Although rainwater harvesting would appear to be a win-win solution to the problem of developing new sources of water, implementing
rainwater harvesting in the American West has been fraught with tensions that have pitted rural farmers and other agricultural interests
against urban and suburban homeowners.3 The water law of the western states is based on the prior appropriation doctrine, which gives
senior appropriators priority over junior appropriators in the right to
use water, especially when a surface water source becomes over-appropriated because it carries too little water relative to all the water
rights.4 Rainwater harvesting creates issues when downstream agricultural irrigators become concerned that the collection and use of rainwater by urban and suburban homeowners in the aggregate may
reduce the amount of water that is available to satisfy their senior
water rights. Homeowners, incredulous about the illegality of placing
rain barrels under gutters and downspouts, have used their growing
political clout to convince state legislatures in the American West to
enact statutes explicitly permitting rainwater harvesting.
Since water rights are property rights under the prior appropriation
doctrine, state statutes and regulations that affect water rights risk giving senior appropriators a takings claim with the resulting requirement to pay just compensation. Based on the nature of rainwater
harvesting and judicial interpretations of federal and state constitutional takings clauses, the most likely claims by downstream agricultural irrigators are that statutes authorizing rainwater harvesting are
per se physical takings. Such takings require compensation even
though they do not result in the total loss of the right to use water or
have a minimal economic impact on a senior appropriator.5
2. A typical rainwater harvesting system in the western United States uses the
roof of a structure to catch the rain, a first flush device to remove accumulated debris
flushed from the roof by the rain, a network of gutters and drainpipes to route the
water, and an above-ground tank or underground cistern to store the water. A filtration system may also be needed if the water will be used for drinking water or other
household uses. See R. Waskom & J. Kallenberger, Graywater Use and Rainwater
Harvesting, COLO. ST. UNIV. EXTENSION (July 2009), https://www.csu.org/CSUDocuments/iwrpgraywaterrainwater.pdf [https://permacc/YWD4-5NSH].
3. See Stephen N. Bretsen, Rainwater Harvesting Under Colorado’s Prior Appropriation Doctrine: Property Rights and Takings, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 159,
160–62 (2011). The current article updates and adapts from this older article.
4. Descriptions of the prior appropriation doctrine appear repeatedly in the academic literature. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or
Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881, 882 (2000).
5. See Bretsen, supra note 3, at 211.
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To avoid the compensation requirement of federal and state constitution takings clauses, legislatures in states that have adopted the
prior appropriation doctrine need to draft statutes authorizing rainwater harvesting in ways that take advantage of how existing state law
creates property rights in water. The recent rainwater harvesting statutes enacted in Colorado demonstrate how the no-injury requirement
placed on junior appropriators limits the scope of the senior appropriators’ water rights and can be used to avoid a taking.6
I.

NEW WATER

AND

RAINWATER HARVESTING

Developing new sources of water in Colorado will be critical due to
a combination of population growth and climate change. According to
Colorado’s Water Plan, the population of Colorado is expected to
grow from 5.2 million in 2015 to between 8.3 million and 9.2 million by
2050.7 Throughout this time period, over 80% of Colorado’s population will live along the urbanized Front Range on the eastern slope of
the Rocky Mountains.8 In addition to the increasing demand for
water, especially along the Front Range, Colorado faces the
probability of a diminishing supply of water. As the Water Plan notes,
“[c]limate change and its associated effects make it more difficult to
meet Colorado’s future water needs because of . . . potential big swings in precipitation patterns and amounts of precipitation in the future.”9 The combination of increased demand and decreased supply
creates the risk of a water supply gap, especially for municipal purposes like residential drinking water. According to the Water Plan,
“the completion of proposed water projects [is] likely insufficient to
address projected 2050 shortfalls [in the municipal water supply] that
could total more than 500,000 acre-feet statewide.”10
Despite these dire predictions, rainwater harvesting does not appear to be part of the solution in Colorado. The Water Plan only mentions rainwater harvesting twice—once to describe the state’s sole
rainwater harvesting pilot project and a second time to note that prorainwater harvesting comments were received as part of the public
input in developing the plan.11 However, rainwater harvesting has not
6. Id. at 225.
7. Colorado’s Water Plan, COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., at 5–4 (2015),
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/CWP2016.pdf [hereinafter Colorado’s Water Plan].
8. Colo.’s 2016 Population & Econ. Overview, COLO. DEP’T OF LOC. AFF., https:/
/demography.dola.colorado.gov/crosstabs/2016-overview/ [https://permacc/32LH-MB
HV] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
9. Colorado’s Water Plan, supra note 7, at 1-9.
10. Id. An acre-foot is enough water to cover an acre of land with one foot of
water, or about 326,000 gallons of water. See What’s an Acre-Foot, WATER EDUC.
FOUND., http://www.watereducation.org/general-information/whats-acre-foot [https://
permacc/KLW2-ZJXR] (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
11. Colorado’s Water Plan, supra note 7, at 6-63, & app. F-4.
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always been neglected as a means of bridging the water supply gap.12
According to a 2007 study prepared, in part, for the Colorado Water
Conservation Board, rainwater and snowmelt harvesting could reduce
outdoor water demand by approximately 65% to 88% when combined
with active water management techniques ranging from “moderate
conservation” to “water wise conservation” scenarios.13
Ironically, at the time of this 2007 study, rainwater harvesting was
illegal in Colorado, and the uncertain role of rainwater harvesting as a
supply-side solution to Colorado’s municipal water gap reflects its
changing legal status. Although Colorado is perceived to be an environmentally progressive state, it has been slower than other western
states in more fully authorizing rainwater harvesting. Utah did so in
2010,14 and California did so in 2012 with the Rainwater Capture
Act.15 In Colorado, over the last ten years, rainwater harvesting has
moved from being illegal, to being allowed under limited circumstances at the time the 2015 state Water Plan was published, to being
allowed more broadly the year after the plan was published. Colorado’s love-hate relationship with rainwater harvesting reflects the influence of the prior appropriation doctrine, a tug-of-war between
urban, residential interests and rural, agricultural interests, and at
least a theoretical concern about property rights and takings.
II. THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WATER

AND

The water law in Colorado, as it is in other western states, is based
on the prior appropriation doctrine.16 The rise of the prior appropriation doctrine reflects the limited availability of water in the American
West and how the lack of water became the dominant factor in the
economic and institutional development of the West.17 While the
western landscape has often been associated with mountains, another
profound feature has been that “[w]ith local and minor exceptions, the
lands beyond the 100th meridian received less than twenty inches of
annual rainfall, and twenty inches was the minimum for unaided agri12. David Beaujon, Rainwater Harvesting in Colorado, 09-02 COLO. LEGIS. COUNSTAFF ISSUE BRIEF 1, (2009), http://hermes.cde.state.co.us/drupal/islandora/object/
co%3A2467/datastream/OBJ/view [https://permacc/QGW4-LX5M].
13. Holistic Approach to Sustainable Water Management in Nw. Douglas Cty. 2,
COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., (2007), http://cwcbweblink.state.co.us/weblink/
docview.aspx?id=105705&searchhandle=8365&dbid=0 [https://permacc/6W6N-LXB5]
[hereinafter DOUGLAS COUNTY WATER STUDY].
14. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1.5 (LexisNexis 2013).
15. CAL. WATER CODE § 10570 (West 2017).
16. Colorado’s Water Plan, supra note 7, at 2-3. GEORGE VRANESH, VRANESH’S
COLORADO WATER LAW 7-9 (James N. Corbridge & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed.
1999).
17. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 3; See generally, Stephen N. Bretsen & P.J. Hill,
Irrigation Institutions in the American West, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 283
(2006–2007).
CIL
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culture.”18 In Colorado, “[w]ith annual average rainfall averaging less
than fifteen inches . . . , melting snow was the primary source of
water” for irrigation and other purposes.19
The starting point of the prior appropriation doctrine in Colorado
and other western states is the vesting of ownership of water in the
state. From its ratification in 1876 to the present, the Colorado Constitution has declared that “[t]he water of every natural stream, not
heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to
the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.”20 Although the state owns the water, this ownership
interest does not automatically give the public the right to use water.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the declaration of state
ownership of water in the Colorado Constitution “was primarily intended to preserve the historical appropriation system of water rights
upon which the irrigation economy in Colorado was founded, rather
than to assure public access to waters for purposes other than appropriation.”21 However, this declaration provides the legal foundation
for the state’s role in the creation, transfer, and loss of water rights
through a combination of regulatory agencies and a system of special
water courts.22
Since the state owns the water, the property right created in water is
a use or usufructuary right.23 Under the prior appropriation doctrine,
water rights are created when surface water is diverted for a beneficial
use.24 The water right’s seniority is established under the rubric of
“first in time, first in right,” which gives the first appropriator from a
surface water source rights that are senior to subsequent appropriators.25 The property right in water “is not a right to specific water
itself, but rather a right to divert a quantity of water, in accordance
with one’s priority” from a certain point in a stream system.26
The value of a water right is in its priority, which has been characterized as “the most valuable stick in the bundle”27 so that to “deprive
a person of his priority is to deprive him of a most valuable property
18. WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY
POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST 214 (1954).
19. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 3.
20. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
21. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979).
22. See Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law
for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 861
(2001).
23. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 30.
24. Kobobel v. State, 249 P.3d 1127, 1134 (Colo. 2011).
25. Comstock v. Ramsay, 133 P. 1107, 1110 (Colo. 1913).
26. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 30.
27. Gregory J. Hobbs, Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32
ENVTL. L. 37, 43 (2002).
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right.”28 A senior appropriator with a decreed water right can use its
priority on a stream system to require the State Engineer to close the
diversion works of junior appropriators to protect its senior water
rights and meet its needs.29 The concept of priority and its value highlights that the property right in water is a use right under the prior
appropriation doctrine.30
The concept of beneficial use plays a dual role since it both creates
and limits the property right in water.31 Beneficial use as a limitation
is encompassed in the idea of the duty of water, which “draws a distinction between the maximum rate of diversion and the total amount
of water that may be diverted. The former is controlled by the decree,
while the latter is determined by the reasonable needs of the purpose
for which the decree was entered.”32 Although property rights in
water are created and strengthened by continuous diversions of surface water for beneficial uses, water rights are not permanent and can
be abandoned or forfeited for failing to divert or to make beneficial
use of the water.33
In Colorado, the right to use water is considered a private property
right.34 The property right to use water is most often treated as an
interest in real property.35 However, the Colorado courts have offered
a confusing array of common law categories of property over time to
try to describe the nature of the property right in water:
Water rights have been characterized as a freehold, Gutheil Park
Inv. Co. v. Montclair, 32 Colo. 420, 76 P. 1050 (1904); Grand Valley
28. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Colo. 1982).
29. Id. at 1377; Mari W. Deminski, Water Rights: Real Property, in COLORADO
WATER LAW BENCHBOOK § 7.2.5 (Carrie L. Ciliberto & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1st
ed. Supp. 2010). However, both Professor Tarlock and Justice Hobbs note that such
enforcement of priorities may be more of a theoretical exercise than an actual practice. A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric? 76 N.D. L.
REV. 881, 883 (2000); Hobbs, supra note 27, at 43.
30. The concept that water itself is not owned is highlighted by the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act, which defines a “water right” as “the right to
use in accordance with its priority a certain portion of the waters of the state by reason of appropriation of the same.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(12) (2016).
31. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d. 46, 53 (Colo.
1999).
32. Id.
33. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 251–54.
34. Kobobel v. State, 249 P.3d 1127, 1134 (Colo. 2011); see also Strickler v. City of
Colo. Springs, 26 P. 313, 314 (Colo. 1891). Although the question of water rights as
property rights appears to be well-settled in Colorado, legal scholars consider the
matter unsettled. See Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2002); Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 691–92 (2008); Scott Andrew Shepard, The Unbearable Cost of Skipping the Check: Property Rights, Takings
Compensation & Ecological Protection in the Western Water Law Context, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1063, 1116 (2009); Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property
Rights in Water, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 50–53 (2010).
35. Deminski, supra note 29, at § 3.2.3.
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Irrigation Co. v. Lesher, 28 Colo. 273, 65 P. 44 (1901), see also Comstock v. Olney Springs Drainage Dist., 97 Colo. 416, 50 P.2d 531
(1935); Davis v. Randall, 44 Colo. 488, 99 P. 322 (1908); Monte Vista
Canal Co. v. Centennial Irrigating Ditch Co., 22 Colo. App. 364, 123
P. 831 (1912); as an interest in real estate, West End Irrigation Co. v.
Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184 P.2d 476 (1947); Talcott v. Mastin, 20
Colo. App. 488, 79 P. 973 (1905); as a property right lacking the
dignity of an estate in fee, Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 279 P.2d 420 (1955); as personal property,
Brighton Ditch Co. v. Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951); and, perhaps most accurately, as a “usufructuary” right, Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., supra; see also Wheeler v. Northern
Colo. Irrigation Co., 10 Colo. 582, 17 P. 487 (1887); Monte Vista
Canal Co. v. Centennial Irrigating Ditch Co., supra.36

Perhaps water rights are best understood “as usufructuary rights with
significant physical components” such as physical possession or control via diversion and a beneficial use that is appurtenant to a specific
parcel of land.37 What is certain in Colorado is the importance of preserving the idea of a water right as a private property right as a matter
of public policy. The current state Water Plan notes that the goal of
applying and strengthening the prior appropriation doctrine “requires
[Colorado] to recognize that water rights are property rights whose
owners are free to respond to the economics of the marketplace and
to continue to work within [Colorado’s] local control structure.”38
The property rights in water of senior appropriators are especially
important when surface water sources are already over-appropriated.
Surface water is considered over-appropriated “when there is not
enough water in the stream during irrigation season or at other times
of the year to satisfy all decreed appropriations.”39 Over-appropriation is an issue in Colorado and impacts streams on the Front Range
and eastern plains of Colorado, where the controversy over rainwater
harvesting has been most intense.40 And over-appropriation is not a
new issue in Colorado. With over-appropriation occurring as early as
the 1890s on some streams, junior water rights can have priorities as
36. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982).
37. Josh Patashnik, Physical Takings, Regulatory Takings, and Water Rights, 51
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 390 (2011) (citing High Plains A&M, LLC v. Se. Colo.
Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 717 (Colo. 2005)).
38. Colorado’s Water Plan, supra note 7, at 1-1.
39. Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 330 (Colo. 1973).
40. Beaujon, supra note 12, at 2; Matthew S. Pozanovic & Carmen S. Hall, Surface
Water Rights, in COLORADO WATER LAW BENCHBOOK 2–6 (Carrie L. Cilberto &
Timothy J. Flanagan eds., CLE in Colorado, 1st ed. Supp. 2009); City of Thornton v.
Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 71 n. 66 (Colo. 1996) (noting that the South Platte
River Basin is substantially over-appropriated); Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Shelton, 529 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Colo. 1974) (noting that the Arkansas River is “greatly
over-appropriated”); Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass’n v. Glacier View Meadows,
550 P.2d 288, 290 (Colo. 1976) (agreeing that the Cache La Poudre River is overappropriated except during flood stages).

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-3\TWR304.txt

172

unknown

Seq: 8

19-JAN-18

TEX. A&M J. PROP. L.

12:43

[Vol. 4

old as 100 years.41 Priority becomes an especially critical element of a
water right in an over-appropriated water basin, with rainwater as part
of the equation. From the perspective of a downstream senior appropriator, rainwater that seemingly disappears into the ground becomes
water needed to satisfy its water rights.
III. RAINWATER HARVESTING

AS A

CRIME

Rainwater harvesting was considered illegal in Colorado prior to
2009 based on its strict application of the prior appropriation doctrine.42 At one time, the Colorado Division of Water Resources noted
that “in much of the state, it is illegal to divert rainwater falling on
your property expressly for a certain use unless you have a very old
water right or during occasional periods where there is surplus water
in a river system.”43 Prior to 2009, all rainwater captured out-of-priority had to be replaced in the stream system in like time and place.44
Even though Colorado had no law until 2009 specifically prohibiting
rainwater harvesting, the Colorado Division of Water Resources was
relying on constitutional and statutory provisions.
After declaring public ownership of unappropriated water in
streams,45 the Colorado Constitution guarantees that “[t]he right to
divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial
uses shall never be denied.”46 In addition to creating a legal framework for granting private water rights, the constitutional language also
creates a limitation. Since the legislature cannot grant rights that exceed those provided by the constitution,47 the water that is subject to
appropriation in Colorado is limited to “the . . . waters of any natural
stream.”48 In Colorado, such surface water is fed by a combination of
snowmelt and rainwater.49
While rain may be identifiable as rainwater, it is or is on its way to
becoming some other form of water once it hits the ground, such as
surface water, groundwater, water being consumed by a plant, or
water evaporating back into the atmosphere. One form of surface
41. Pozanovic & Hall, supra note 40, at § 9.3.
42. M. Subramanian, Rainwater Harvesting Catches the Attention of State and Local Government, 12 W. WATER L. & POL’Y REP. 226, 227–28 (June 2008).
43. Bretsen, supra note 3, at 168; see also Matt Corrion, Collecting Rainwater Still
Illegal in Much of Colorado, OUTDOOR DESIGN GRP., http://www.lot-lines.com/collecting-rainwater-still-illegal-in-much-of-colorado/ [https://permacc/UH8Z-N3TM].
44. Carolyn F. Burr & James N. Noble, Rainwater Harvesting: A New Water Supply Option in Colorado?, COLO.B. ASS’N 1 (2008), http://webcache.googleusercontent
.com/search?q=cache:lIWekxMmnOsJ:www.cba.cobar.org/repository/Inside_Bar/Wa
ter%2520Law/October%25209,%25202008/Rainwater%2520Harvesting%2520Hand
out-10-9-08.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us [https://permacc/5AQ3-KKXK].
45. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
46. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
47. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).
48. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
49. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 3.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-3\TWR304.txt

2018]

unknown

RAINWATER HARVESTING

Seq: 9

IN

COLORADO

19-JAN-18

12:43

173

water is diffused surface water, defined as “water from rain, melting
snow, springs, or seepage, or detached from subsiding floods, which
lies or flows on the surface of the earth but does not form part of a
watercourse or lake.”50 The key issue for classifying water as either
surface water or diffused surface water is whether it has flowed into a
discrete watercourse or body of water.51 In several western states that
have adopted the prior appropriation doctrine, diffused surface water
is not water subject to appropriation and is instead governed by common law property doctrines that address how one can affect the property of another based on how water is controlled, drained, or used.52
These doctrines allow property owners to capture and store diffuse
surface water before it reaches a surface water course or body of
water or the adjacent property.53
However, due to Colorado’s strict application of the prior appropriation doctrine, the common law doctrines that govern diffused surface
water are inapplicable, at least in practice if not in theory.54 According
to the Colorado Supreme Court, the constitutional provisions establishing water subject to appropriation “were intended to be used in
their broadest scope” so that intermittent streams and water that is
tributary to a natural stream are included within the constitutional
language.55 All flowing water, whether from a spring, an underground
stream, or via percolation or seepage, as well as all groundwater, is
presumed to be tributary to a natural stream, and the burden of proof
is on the one asserting that the flowing water or groundwater is not
tributary to a natural stream to prove that fact by clear and satisfactory evidence.56 Thus, the question in Colorado is ultimately not
whether water is surface water, groundwater, or diffused surface
water. Instead, “[t]he real question to be asked is whether water, even
if diffused, is tributary to a natural stream.”57 Given the presumption,
little, if any, rainwater in Colorado could be classified as diffuse surface water that is subject to the ownership and control of a landowner
under common law property doctrines. Instead, rainwater is more
50. DAVID H. GETCHES, SANDRA B. ZELLMER, & ADELL L. AMOS, WATER LAW
NUTSHELL 278 (5th ed. 2015) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 846
(AM. LAW. INST. 1965)).
51. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 50, at 94–96.
52. William P. Elliott II, Diffused Surface Water in Wyoming: Ascertaining Property Owners’ Rights and Settling Disputes, 11 WYO. L. REV. 409, 410–11 (2011).
53. State v. Hiber, 44 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Wyo. 1935); see also, LAWRENCE J.
MACDONNELL, TREATISE ON WYOMING WATER LAW 84, 90 (2014).
54. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 116.
55. In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1914). Colorado statutes confirm the constitutional language by stating that “[t]he water of every natural
stream, as referred to in sections 5 and 6 of article XVI of the state constitution,
includes all the water occurring within the state of Colorado which is in or tributary to
a natural surface stream but does not include nontributary groundwater as that term
is defined in section 37-90-103.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-101(1) (2016).
56. Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951).
57. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 116.
IN A

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-3\TWR304.txt

174

unknown

TEX. A&M J. PROP. L.

Seq: 10

19-JAN-18

12:43

[Vol. 4

likely to be water that a senior appropriator could claim was needed
to satisfy its water right.58
Reinforcing the uncertain and limited status of diffused surface
water in Colorado is another statute referenced by the Colorado Division of Water Resources as legal support for its position that rainwater
harvesting was illegal.59 The Colorado Weather Modification Act,
originally enacted in 1963 and reenacted in 1972, declares that
Colorado:
[C]laims the right to all moisture suspended in the atmosphere
which falls or is artificially induced to fall within its borders. Said
moisture is declared to be the property of the people of this state,
dedicated to their use pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of article XVI of
the Colorado constitution and as otherwise provided by law.60

The effect of the law is to extend the original 1876 constitutional declaration of state ownership and water subject to appropriation from
only natural streams to include rainwater and other forms of precipitation. In theory, the Colorado Weather Modification Act would preempt even the idea of rainwater becoming diffused surface water
because no rain could be considered private water subject to common
law private property doctrines.
In 2009, a Colorado law authorizing small-scale rainwater harvesting in limited circumstances included enforcement provisions for the
first time.61 A violation of the law’s regulations, such as an unauthorized rainwater system, allowed the State Engineer to seek an injunction from the appropriate water court and collect court costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees from the violator.62 A fine of $500 could be
imposed for each violation.63
As an illegal activity, rainwater harvesting was presumed to injure
the water rights of senior appropriators. Overcoming this presumption
required a rainwater harvester to develop costly hydrological evidence
or submit a plan to augment all of the rain captured out of priority.64
58. “States seeking broad control of waters are likely to define diffused surface
waters narrowly.” GETCHES ET AL., supra note 50, at 292. Several other western states
besides Colorado, such as Nevada, Oregon, and Utah, extend state control to diffused
surface water. Id. at 292–93 (citing In re Manse Spring v. Merickel Holding Corp., 108
P.2d 311, 314 (Nev. 1940); O.R.S. § 537.110 (2015); Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, 368 P.2d
461, 463 (Utah 1962); Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation Co., 80 P.2d 458
(Utah 1938)). Like Colorado, the “Utah approach is based upon the realization that
stream flow depends on runoff.” GETCHES ET AL., supra note 50, at 293.
59. Corrion, supra note 43.
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-103 (2016). The Colorado Weather Modification
Act was amended to shift its repeal date from July 1, 2011 to September 1, 2018.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-127 (2016).
61. See infra, notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-602(1)(g)(V)(B) (2015).
63. Id. § 37-92-602(1)(g)(V)(C) (2015).
64. Beaujon, supra note 12, at 2; Authorization of Pilot Projects for the Beneficial
Use of Captured Precipitation in New Real Estate Developments: Criteria and Guide-
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As residential homeowners in Colorado discovered that rainwater
harvesting was essentially illegal, they began complaining to their
state legislators, who crafted political solutions that tried to balance
the desires of rainwater harvesters with the rights of senior appropriators.65 Although these statutory schemes permitting rainwater harvesting removed its taint as a crime, they raised issues of whether their
authorizations created a taking of senior appropriators’ water rights.
IV. RAINWATER HARVESTING

AS A

TAKING

The taking issue arises because rainwater harvesting statutes permit
newer appropriators living upstream to intercept rain and use the
water in ways that could interfere with the property rights in water
that Colorado has granted to downstream senior appropriators. From
the perspective of a downstream senior appropriator, an upstream
rainwater harvester is taking out of priority. In addition, to the extent
that a rainwater harvester is consuming water beyond what would be
lost to evapotranspiration, the rainwater harvester is depriving a senior appropriator of the opportunity to use the full amount of its
water right, especially in an over-appropriated stream.66
As private property, water rights are protected from takings under
the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution.67 Both
contain public use and just compensation requirements, and the Colorado Constitution provides even greater protection by requiring just
compensation if property is “taken or damaged.”68 Courts employ a
two-part test to determine if a government action constitutes a taking:
lines for the “Rainwater Harvesting” Pilot Program 1, COLO. WATER CONSERVATION
BD. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://cwcbweblink.state.co.us/WebLink/ElectronicFile.aspx?docid
=142162&searchid=c25573eb-f1b7-4b8c-9810-6dd02adee4e2&dbid=0 [https://perma
cc/WXR5-ER37].
65. Steven K. Paulson, Get Out Your Rain Barrels; New Law Lets Some of You
Collect Water, THE GAZETTE (June 30, 2009), http://www.gazette.com/articles/barrels57687-colorado-denver.html [https://permacc/795K-EHK3].
66. See Arlene J. Kwasniak & Daniel R. Hursh, Right to Rainwater – A Cloudy
Issue, 26 WINDSOR REV. OF LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 105, 110–11 (2009) (suggesting in
an exploration of rainwater harvesting in Canada that large-scale rainwater harvesting
could impact the entire water cycle and other users).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; COLO. CONST. art. II,
§§ 14–15.
68. The purpose of the “damage” provision of the Colorado Constitution was “to
grant relief to property owners who [have] been substantially damaged by the making
of . . . public improvements abutting their lands, but whose property has not been
physically taken by the government.” City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175,
179 (Colo. 1993). “A priority to the use of water for irrigation or domestic purposes is
a property right” constitutionally protected from damage. Game & Fish Comm’n v.
Farmers Irrigation Co., 426 P.2d 562, 565 (1967). The takings analysis of the “damage”
provision is similar to the multi-factor balancing test used by the United States Supreme Court to review partial regulatory takings. See infra, notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
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First, the court determines whether the claimant has identified a
cognizable Fifth Amendment property interest that is asserted to be
the subject of the taking. Second, if the court concludes that a cognizable property interest exists, it determines whether the government’s action amounted to a compensable taking of that interest.69

For water rights under the prior appropriation doctrine, a “cognizable property interest” depends on state law,70 and in Colorado, the
property right in water is strong.71 Colorado, like most western states,
has not adopted the public trust doctrine, and Colorado is one of the
few prior appropriation states that has not incorporated a public interest standard into its statutory provisions on water rights.72 Although
the property right in water is strong in Colorado, it is not absolute.
Doctrines such as abandonment, waste, and the no-injury rule place
boundaries around the property right.73 Thus, in a takings analysis,
both parts of the test must be examined.
A. Colorado’s Rainwater Harvesting Statutes
The nature of the government’s action is found in three rainwater
harvesting statutes that Colorado enacted between 2009 and 2016. The
first two, Senate Bill 09-08074 (“SB 09-080”) and House Bill 09-112975
(“HB 09-1129”), enacted in 2009, are limited in their scope, while the
third, House Bill 16-100576 (“HB 16-1005”) enacted in 2016, allows
residential rainwater harvesting to become widespread. The third statute supplements rather than supersedes the earlier ones.77
SB 09-080 authorizes small-scale rainwater harvesting for household
purposes, fire protection, domesticated-animal watering, and irrigating gardens or lawns of up to one acre.78 However, the statute also
limits rainwater harvesting to single house or a small cluster of houses
drawing water from small capacity wells in designated groundwater
69. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
70. Id.
71. See supra Section III.
72. Marcus J. Lock, Braving the Waters of Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence:
Will the Fifth Amendment Protect Western Water Rights from Federal Environmental
Regulation?, 4 U. DEN. WATER L. REV. 76, 85–86 (2000). See People v. Emmert, 597
P.2d 1025, 1027–29 (Colo. 1979); Zellmer & Harder, supra note 34, at 733–34.
73. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 245–66.
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-105(1)(f), § 37-92-602(1)(g) (2017).
75. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-115(6) (2017).
76. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-96.5-101–105, §§ 25-1.5.210(1)(g), 38-33.3-106.5(1)(j)
(2017).
77. Rainwater Collection, COLO. DIV. OF WATER RESOURCES, http://water.state.co
.us/SurfaceWater/RainwaterCollection/Pages/default.aspx [https://permacc/KTD8ELML].
78. COLO. REV. STAT. §37-90-105(f) (2017). See Bretsen, supra note 3, at 172–73
(describing the statute in more detail.)
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basins or exempt wells elsewhere.79 The first limitation relates to the
eight designated groundwater basins established by the Colorado
Groundwater Commission, which are all on the eastern plains of Colorado and removed from the urbanized areas of the Front Range.80
Groundwater within such basins is presumed to be designated groundwater that is not required to fulfill surface water rights and “has no
more than a de minimis impact” on surface stream flows.81 The second
limitation ties rainwater harvesting to small capacity and exempt
wells, which are restricted to flow rates ranging from fifteen to fifty
gallons per minute and uses ranging from residential household and
lawn irrigation to watering livestock and fire protection.82
HB 09-1129 authorizes larger, development-wide rainwater harvesting pilot projects for non-potable uses.83 The purpose of these projects
is to develop information on precipitation and return flows to evaluate
rainwater harvesting system designs, “measure precipitation capture
efficiencies,” and “quantify the amount of precipitation that must be
augmented to prevent injury to decreed rights.”84 For the first two
years, each project must have a substitute water supply plan to replace
the water captured from the development’s rooftops and impermeable
surfaces.85 After this initial period, the pilot project may either apply
to a water court for a permanent augmentation plan or permanently
retire the rainwater harvesting system.86 The projects are supposed to
consist of a variety of sizes, geographic areas, and hydrological conditions, with priority given to projects in areas facing renewable water
supply challenges.87 Although ten pilot projects are authorized, the
current state Water Plan indicates that only one is in place—the Sterling Ranch Precipitation Harvesting Pilot Study for a 3,400 acre
planned development in the Denver metropolitan area.88
However, the demand for rainwater harvesting was not sated by
these limited authorizations, and incredulous voters in the heavily
populated urban areas running along the eastern edge of the Rocky
Mountains, from Pueblo in the south to Fort Collins in the north,
79. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-105(1)(f)(I)–(II), 37-92-602(1)(g)(I) and (III)
(2017).
80. Designated Basins and Ground Water Management Districts, COLORADO
GROUND WATER COMMISSION, http://water.state.co.us/groundwater/CGWC/Pages/
ManagementDistricts.aspx [https://permacc/EKV2-U63Z].
81. Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 147 P.3d 20, 28–29 (Colo. 2006); see
COLO. REV. STAT. §37-90-103(6)(a) (2016).
82. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-105(1)(a)–(e) (2016); §§ 37-92-602(1)(b)–(f)
(2016).
83. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-115(6)(a) (2016). See Bretsen, supra note 3, at
173–75 (describing the statute in more detail.)
84. Id.
85. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-115(6)(c)(I), 37-92-308(4)(a) (2016).
86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-115(6)(c)(II)(A) (2016).
87. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-115(6)(b)(III)–(V) (2016).
88. Colorado’s Water Plan, supra note 7, at 6-63.
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placed political pressure for change on their state legislators. During
the 2015 session of the Colorado General Assembly, three legislators
representing Pueblo, Colorado Springs, and Wheat Ridge introduced
House Bill 15-1259, a broader rainwater harvesting bill that would
have allowed collection from residential rooftops and storage in a
maximum of two rain barrels.89 The bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 45-20, but was opposed by agricultural interests, such as the Colorado Farm Bureau, the Colorado Corn Growers
Association, and water districts on the eastern plains.90 A state senator on the Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy Committee
from Sterling, a farming and ranching community on the eastern
plains, was able to keep the bill from being debated on the Senate
floor.91
A second attempt the next year was successful. This broader rainwater harvesting law has been touted as a bipartisan one that balances
the interests of different water users.92 The statute begins by reaffirming the prior appropriation doctrine and declaring that “nothing in
this article is intended to infringe upon or impair the doctrine of prior
appropriation.”93 The next declaration states that “the use of a rain
barrel does not constitute a water right.”94 This latter declaration reinforces the prior two and represents a key compromise made to assuage the concerns of downstream senior appropriators.95 Rainwater
can only be collected via the gutters and downspouts connected to the
roof of a building used primarily as a single-family residence or as a
multi-family residence with four or fewer units, which excludes large
apartment buildings and all commercial buildings.96 To comply with
the declaration that nothing in the statute is intended to impair the
prior appropriation doctrine, two restrictions are placed on homeowners. First, the collection system is limited to two rain barrels with a
maximum combined storage capacity of 110 gallons.97 Second, the
89. Lynn Bartels, Sen. Jerry Sonnenberg: No Rain Barrels for You, THE DENVER
POST: THE SPOT FOR POL. & POL’Y (May 6, 2015, 9:13 AM), http://blogs.denverpost
.com/thespot/2015/05/06/sen-jerry-sonnenberg-no-rain-barrels-for-you/119911/ [https:/
/permacc/MF33-VSZJ].
90. Joey Bunch, Colorado Household Rain Barrel Law Takes Effect Wednesday,
THE DENVER POST (Aug. 9, 2016, 6:53 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/08/05/
colorado-household-rain-barrel-law-takes-effect-tuesday/ [https://permacc/D7V6UDS3]; Jack Healy, A Thirsty Colorado Is Battling Over Who Owns Raindrops, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/us/a-thirsty-colorado-bat
tles-over-the-destiny-of-its-raindrops-drought.html?_r=0 [https://permacc/XYP8-RH5
M].
91. Bartels, supra note 89; Healy, supra note 90.
92. Kole Kelley, Legislative Report, 20 U. DEN. WATER L. REV. 119, 120 (2016);
Bunch, supra note 90.
93. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-96.5-101(1)–(2) (2016).
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-96.5-101(3) (2016).
95. Kelley, supra note 92, at 121; Bunch, supra note 90.
96. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-96.5-103(1)(b) (2016).
97. Id. § 37-96.5-103(1)(a) (2016).
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rainwater must only be used for outdoor purposes on the residential
property where it is collected.98 To further protect downstream senior
appropriators, the State Engineer is given authority to curtain rain
barrel usage if downstream senior appropriators are materially injured. In addition, the State Engineer must monitor and report to the
agricultural committees of the General Assembly on the impact of the
authorized rainwater harvesting on downstream water rights.99
B. Regulatory Takings of Water Rights
Since Colorado’s current rainwater harvesting statutes authorize
and regulate rainwater harvesting systems rather than condemn water
rights, the takings analysis based on the nature of the government action involves examining the regulatory takings jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court and the Colorado Supreme Court.100
Over time, the United States Supreme Court has developed three
means of analyzing the nature of a government regulatory action in
response to a takings claim based on the degree to which the regulation burdens private property rights:
Our precedents stake out two categories of regulatory action that
generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. First, where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property—however minor—it must
provide just compensation. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (state law requiring landlords to
permit cable companies to install cable facilities in apartment buildings effected a taking). A second categorical rule applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of “all economically
beneficial us[e]” of her property. Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1019 (emphasis in original). We held in Lucas that the government must pay just
compensation for such “total regulatory takings,” except to the extent that “background principles of nuisance and property law” independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property. Id., at
1026-1032.
Outside these two relatively narrow categories (and the special
context of land-use exactions. . .), regulatory takings challenges are
governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). . .. .101
98. Id. § 37-96.5-103(1)(c), (d) (2016). To emphasize the requirement of outdoor
use, the statute contains another provision prohibiting indoor or drinking water uses.
Id. § 37-96.5-103(2) (2016).
99. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-96.5-103(3), 105 (2016).
100. Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Simpson, 877 P.2d 335, 346 (Colo.
1994) (“[T]his court has considered decisions of the United States Supreme Court
construing the federal takings clause as a guide in determining what constitutes a
taking under the comparable provision of the Colorado Constitution.”).
101. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005).
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Rainwater harvesting does not implicate the second type of categorical rule based on total regulatory takings of water rights. In Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,102 the United States Supreme Court
considered a total regulatory taking caused by a confiscatory regulation (i.e., “a regulation that prohibits all economically beneficial use of
land”)103 a per se taking because “the total deprivation of beneficial
use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation.”104 With rainwater harvesting, no matter how the impact on the senior appropriator is categorized or described, the senior
appropriator does not lose all the economically beneficial use of the
water right. The senior appropriator’s water right and its priority continue to exist, and the senior appropriator can enforce its priority
against other junior appropriators. In addition, the senior appropriator receives the benefit of any return flow from the rainwater harvester’s activities based on the priority of its water right.105
Rainwater harvesting also does not implicate the third category
based on a partial regulatory taking of water rights, which occurs
when the regulation “goes too far”106 in its impact on the use of the
property even though some economically beneficial use remains. Unlike a total regulatory taking, a partial regulatory taking is not a per se
taking. Instead, as set forth in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, courts are
instructed to balance the following factors: (i) the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant; (ii) the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with the claimant’s distinct investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.107 The Court
noted that the focus of this balancing of the burdens and benefits of
the regulatory scheme is “both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole,”108 and in a later case noted that “at least where an owner
possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one
‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety.”109 As with the total regulatory takings analysis,
rainwater harvesting activities would not completely affect the priority
of the senior appropriator’s water right since the senior appropriator
retains his or her priority against all other junior appropriators. In ad102. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
103. Id. at 1029.
104. Id. at 1017. Similarly, Colorado courts recognize that a government regulation
that prohibits all reasonable use of property is a taking. Williams v. City of Central,
907 P.2d 701, 703 (Colo. App. 1995).
105. See VRANESH, supra note 16, at 224–28.
106. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
107. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of
Cty. Comm’rs of La Plata, 38 P.3d 59, 65 (Colo. 2001).
108. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
109. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979).
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dition, while priority may be the most important stick in the bundle of
water rights, it is not the only stick. Other sticks include the amount of
water, the nature of the beneficial use, and the ability to sell, lease, or
encumber the water right.110
In a dispute between the Casitas Municipal Water District and the
Bureau of Reclamation over diverting water through a fish ladder to
protect an endangered species, the water district conceded that if the
taking was deemed to be a partial regulatory taking, it could not prevail.111 The Federal Circuit court noted that the “concession was
prompted by the fact that a plaintiff pursuing a regulatory takings
claim must demonstrate a significant loss of value relative to the property as a whole,” citing Penn Central.112 The court also noted that “no
such limitation exists, however, in the case of a physical taking,” citing
Loretto.113 Thus, if the regulatory taking can be characterized as a per
se physical taking, then the takings claimant is more likely to succeed
based on the application of a categorical rule, which makes this analysis the most promising one for senior appropriators.114
According to Loretto, a permanent physical occupation of private
property results in a taking, no matter how minor and regardless of
the public interest justification.115 As a rationale for the per se nature
of this type of taking, the United States Supreme Court has noted:
Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights
“to possess, use and dispose of it.” To the extent that the government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys
each of these rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the
occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the space. The power to exclude has
traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in
an owner’s bundle of property rights. Second, the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power to
control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others,
but can make no nonpossessory use of the property. Although deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not,
in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking. . . Finally, even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent
occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the

110. VRANESH, supra note 16, at 229.
111. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
112. Id. at n. 3 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31).
113. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
114. James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Weighing the Need to Establish Regulatory Takings Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of Review and Principles, W&M
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 315, 330 (2010).
115. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982).
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right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make
any use of the property.116

Compensation must be paid to the property owner for this type of
taking even if the occupation does not result in a total loss of use of
the property or has a minimal economic impact.117 The United States
Supreme Court subsequently noted that permanent physical occupations resulting in a per se taking are “relatively rare, easily identified,
and usually represent a greater affront to individual property
rights.”118 Despite the assurance that this type of taking is easily identified, legal scholars and courts have disagreed over whether the per se
takings rule that applies to physical occupations can apply to an interference with a senior appropriator’s water rights.
In three pre-Loretto cases, the United States Supreme Court held
that a physical diversion of water affecting existing water rights is a
per se physical taking.119 In International Paper, a government requisition of hydroelectric power redirected water used by a mill.120 In Gerlach and Dugan, a dam built by the Bureau of Reclamation interfered
with the natural flow of a river and impacted the water rights of downstream users.121 The dam was part of a larger project to impound
water to supply other water users.122 In each case, the Court found a
physical taking and characterized it as either the loss of the right to
use the water;123 the loss of beneficial use;124 or the interference with
water rights.125 As the Court noted in Dugan:
A seizure of water rights need not necessarily be a physical invasion
of land. It may occur upstream, as here . . . . Therefore, when the
Government acted here ‘with the purpose and effect of subordinating’ the respondents’ water rights to the Project’s uses ‘whenever it
saw fit,’ ‘with the result of depriving the owner of its profitable use
[there was] the imposition of such a servitude [as] would constitute
an appropriation of property for which compensation should be
made.’126
116. Id. at 435–36 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 441.
118. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
324 (2002).
119. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,
339 U.S. 725 (1950); Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931).
120. 282 U.S. at 405–06.
121. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 729–30; Dugan, 372 U.S. at 614–16.
122. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 729; Dugan, 372 U.S. at 612.
123. Int’l Paper Co., 282 U.S. at 407.
124. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 752–53.
125. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 624–25.
126. Id. Dugan relied, in part, on United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), in
which a taking was found based on the effect of low-level flights by military planes
from an airfield leased by the federal government on a small chicken farm. Id. at
258–59. The Court concluded that the flights resulted in “an intrusion so immediate
and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the property and to limit
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Two more recent cases that applied a per se physical takings analysis
to claims of takings of water rights—Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District v. United States127 and Casitas Municipal Water District v.
United States128—highlight the difficulties in applying these
precedents.129
Tulare applied the per se physical takings rule and found a taking of
water rights without a permanent physical occupation or diversion.130
The California Department of Water Resources’ State Water Project,
which shared a coordinated pumping system with the Bureau of Reclamation’s Central Valley Project, reduced deliveries of water to irrigation districts to bolster instream flows for migrating salmon in the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.131 The water service contracts permitted such reductions to meet the requirements of the Endangered Species Act.132 The court concluded that “[t]he federal government is
certainly free to preserve the fish; it must simply pay for the water it
takes to do so.”133 In addressing the issue of how a usufructuary right
can be physically occupied, the court noted:
While water rights present an admittedly unusual situation, we think
the Causby example is an instructive one. In the context of water
rights, a mere restriction on use—the hallmark of a regulatory action—completely eviscerates the right itself since plaintiffs’ sole entitlement is to the use of the water. See Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249,
252-253 (1853) (“the right of property in water is usufructuary, and
consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use.”).
Unlike other species of property where use restrictions may limit
some, but not all of the incidents of ownership, the denial of a right
to the use of water accomplishes a complete extinction of all value.
Thus, by limiting plaintiffs’ ability to use an amount of water to
which they would otherwise be entitled, the government has essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of the contract rights with
regard to that water and totally displaced the contract holder. That
complete occupation of property—an exclusive possession of plaintiffs’ water-use rights for preservation of the fish—mirrors the invasion present in Causby. To the extent, then, that the federal
government, by preventing plaintiffs from using the water to which
they would otherwise have been entitled, have rendered the usuhis exploitation of it” and was essentially a taking of an easement of airspace. Id. at
265.
127. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
128. 708 F.3d 1340 (2013).
129. The procedural history of Casitas is an example. The Casitas litigation has resulted in six opinions by the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Id. at 1343.
130. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 320
(2001).
131. Id. at 314–16.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 324.
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fructuary right to that water valueless, they have thus effected a
physical taking.134

Tulare combines the legal reasoning underlying Loretto and Causby so
that a physical occupation becomes irrelevant when the government
interferes with the use rights associated with a vested water right.135
Tulare remains a Court of Federal Claims decision because the
United States decided to settle rather than appeal.136 Both legal scholars and other judges have criticized its holding and rationale. Tulare
has been criticized for its failure to first analyze whether a property
right exists under California law given the language of the water service contracts, California’s reasonable use doctrine, and the public
trust doctrine.137 In Klamath Irrigation District v. United States, the
Court of Federal Claims examined similar takings claims by agricultural irrigators when a drought required the Bureau of Reclamation to
reduce water deliveries to satisfy obligations under the Endangered
Species Act.138 The court refused to follow the holding of Tulare, noting that “with all due respect, Tulare appears to be wrong on some
counts, incomplete on others and, distinguishable, at all events.”139
Even the trial judge who authored Tulare refused to later apply its
reasoning in Casitas.140 Although the judge did not disavow the application of the per se physical takings rule to a reduction in water rights
not created by a physical diversion, he felt constrained from using the
rationale in Tulare by the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent
decision in Tahoe-Sierra.141
In Casitas, the Bureau of Reclamation required a water district in
California to construct a fish ladder at a diversion dam and divert
water through it from its canal to protect an endangered trout.142 The
water district claimed that the diversion resulted in a taking due to the
permanent loss of water that would have gone from its canal into its
reservoir and been used for agricultural irrigation.143 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals initially found that the requirements were a per
134. Id. at 319.
135. Kathryn M. Casey, Comment, Water in the West: Vested Water Rights Merit
Protection under the Takings Clause, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 305, 338 (2003).
136. Settlement Agreement at 1-3, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 49 Fed.
Cl. 313 (No. 98-101L), 2004 WL 3728318.
137. See Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 Hasting W.-NW. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 1, 9-11 (2002); Zellmer & Harder, supra note 34, at 739–40; Ling-Yee
Huang, Fifth Amendment Takings & Transitions in Water Law: Compensation (Just)
for the Environment, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 49, 84–85 (2007).
138. 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005).
139. Id. at 538. Ironically, the decision containing this criticism was reversed on
appeal. See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 522 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
140. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 105–06 (2007).
141. Again, ironically, this decision was reversed on appeal. Infra note 142.
142. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
143. Id.
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se physical taking since they physically directed water away from the
plaintiff’s diversion works into the fish ladder, thus permanently taking the water and the right to use that water.144 Instead of a restriction
on use, the court held the requirements to be a direct appropriation of
water for the public purpose of protecting an endangered species.145
On remand, the Court of Federal Claims held that “the only compensable right under California water law is a right to beneficial use” and
no independent right to divert existed independent of beneficial
use.146 Although the water district’s state license allowed it to divert
107,800 acre-feet of water per year, the license also capped its beneficial use at 28,500 acre-feet per year, and with this differential, the
water district was unable to show a reduction in water deliveries despite a loss of water diverted.147 Despite its prior ruling, the Federal
Circuit upheld the decision without overruling itself.148 The Federal
Circuit highlighted that its prior decision only addressed the issue “of
whether a diversion of water from the Robles-Casitas Canal would
constitute a physical or regulatory taking” and was based on the government’s admission for summary judgment purposes that the water
district had a property right in the water at issue.149 With the issue
now about the scope of the water district’s property rights in the diverted water and whether a taking had occurred, the Federal Circuit
stated that the right to use water is a private property right under
California law, but that right is “limited to the beneficial use of water
involved.”150 The failure to show a loss of beneficial use meant that
the water district’s takings claim had not yet accrued, although it
could subsequently bring a claim if it had evidence of such a loss.151
While the water district’s claims were not illegitimate as a per se physical takings claim, they were not ripe for judicial review.152
144. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1291–95 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
145. Id. at 1293.
146. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 455 (2011).
147. Id. at 446. This differential makes the facts of Casitas somewhat unique. “Not
every plaintiff will have a state water right that allows it to divert a certain amount of
water, but limits beneficial use to roughly one-fourth of that amount.” Id. at 470; A.
DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR., DAVID H. GETCHES, REED D. BENSON, &
SARAH F. BATES, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 524 (7th ed. 2014).
148. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
149. Id. at 1345–46. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that it had
“relied on those concessions throughout the first appeal” but that “[t]he government’s
concessions (and this court’s reliance on those concessions) only persisted, however,
through the first appeal.” Id. at 1352–53.
150. Id. at 1354.
151. Id. at 1360.
152. See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 147, at 523–24 (noting “[o]n the one hand, the
Federal Circuit held that the government’s actions in [Casitas] should be analyzed as a
physical taking,” and asking the question “[i]f a plaintiff loses water it could have
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Tulare and Casitas, along with International Paper, Gerlach, and
Dugan, indicate that the connection between statutes authorizing rainwater harvesting and a per se physical taking cannot be simply dismissed.153 Due to their different factual circumstances, Casitas does
not appear to have overruled Tulare, and critics of the Tulare and earlier Casitas decisions have used these different factual circumstances
to propose two different takings analyses.154 For water rights affected
by a requirement to leave water in place to maintain instream flows to
protect endangered species, a partial regulatory takings analysis would
apply.155 However, “when the government restricts water rights in order to permit itself or a third party to make consumptive use of the
water,” a per se physical takings rule would apply.156 In addition, legal
scholars and commentators who support the maintenance of instream
flows at the expense of agricultural irrigators concede that “taking
water from one group of farmers and giving it to another group of
farmers” creates a more compelling takings case than a “government’s
limitation on diversion[s] to protect the health of the aquatic environment as a whole.”157 Even with this distinction in analyses, rainwater
harvesting in Colorado, with its transfer of water rights from rural
farmers to urban and suburban homeowner via a physical diversion
through a rooftop collection system and rain barrels, would seem to
fall on the side of a per se physical taking. At a minimum, the public
interest in allowing rainwater harvesting is certainly less compelling
than the public interest in preserving endangered species. However, as
Casitas reveals, the finding of a physical taking based on the nature of
the government action will not necessarily result in a compensable

beneficially used based on environmental restrictions imposed by the government,
doesn’t a physical taking analysis make that a strong claim?”).
153. “Casitas may or may not prove to be a highly influential case in deciding future claims of water rights takings. For now, it shows that the law in this area remains
hotly debated, and the case results remain unpredictable.” TARLOCK ET AL., supra
note 147, at 524.
154. Patashnik, supra note 37, at 379–81.
155. Id.
156. Id. (noting that “this distinction . . . is compatible with the Supreme Court
water-rights taking precedent”); “Int’l Paper, Gerlach, and Dugan were all examples
of the government restricting the water right.” But see, Washoe Cty. v. United States,
319 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (failing to grant a pipeline right-of-way permit
to facilitate a water right’s change of use of not a physical taking because “the government has neither physically diverted or appropriated any water nor physically reduced
the quantity of water that is available”) (emphasis added).
157. John D. Leshy, A Conversation About Takings and Water Rights, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1985, 2008 (2005); John D. Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional
Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579, 597 (2010) (noting that restrictions on water use
that result in the actual transfer of water interests from one private owner to a new
private owner involve “just the kind of property restrictions ‘of an unusually serious
character’ which, according to the Supreme Court, warrants per se takings treatment”
(citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982))).
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taking in the absence of “a cognizable Fifth Amendment property interest that is asserted to be the subject of the taking.”158
C. Property Rights in Water and the No-Injury Standard
The property interest analysis for claims by downstream senior appropriators that the statutorily authorized activities of upstream rainwater harvesters are a per se physical taking will focus on the concept
of material injury. In Colorado, water rights are not protected from
any injury—only from a material injury.159 The concept of a material
injury paradoxically both protects senior appropriators and defines
the scope of their water rights by limiting their ability to block the
activities of junior appropriators. Although the per se physical takings
rule can result in a taking even with de minimis impairment of a property right, a water right must first be materially injured to qualify as a
property right protected by the per se physical takings rule.
Whether a rainwater harvester as a junior appropriator has materially injured the water rights of a downstream senior appropriator is a
question governed by statute. The State Engineer must examine the
following non-exclusive list of factors before discontinuing a junior appropriator’s diversions based on the materiality of the injury:
[A]ll factors which will determine in each case the amount of water
such discontinuance will make available to senior priorities at the
time and place of their need. Such factors include the current and
prospective volumes of water in and tributary to the stream flow
from which the diversion is being made; distance and type of stream
bed between the diversion points; the various velocities of this
water, both surface and underground; the probable duration of the
available flow; and the predictable return flow to the affected
stream.160

These factors demonstrate that determining the existence of a material injury is fact specific and requires expensive, technical information
developed by hydrologists, water engineers, and other experts.161 This
cost falls heavily on the junior appropriator in a scheme of shifting
burdens of proof since “the ultimate burden of showing absence of
injurious effect by a preponderance of the evidence where contrary
158. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2013); see also, Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 519–20 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
159. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-502(2)(a) (2016).
160. Id. The material injury standard applies whether the diversions are directly
from the surface stream, via a well pumping tributary ground water, or a well pumping what was originally thought to be nontributary designated ground water. See
Strickler v. City of Colo. Springs, 26 P. 313, 315 (Colo. 1891); Kobobel v. State, 249
P.3d 1127, 1136 (Colo. 2011); Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 147 P.3d 20,
32 (Colo. 2006).
161. State Eng’r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496, 508 (Colo. 1993).
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evidence of injury has been presented continues to rest on the applicant [i.e., the junior appropriator seeking a new water right].”162
Given the cost of developing technical information, the evidentiary
presumption that a court is willing to make becomes crucial. Although
the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that “injury ‘must be demonstrated by evidential facts and not potentialities,’”163 in the context of
plans of augmentation, which employ the same scheme of shifting burdens of proof as new diversions and changes in water rights,164 it has
also been willing to presume that tributary groundwater depletions
will injure senior surface water rights when a stream system is overappropriated.165 Further, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that a
prima facie case of material injury can be based on a preponderance
of evidence of injury to senior appropriators generally, rather than to
a particular senior water rights owner.166 A presumption of material
injury combined with the per se nature of a physical taking would allow a senior appropriator to bring a taking claim for the activities of
rainwater harvesters and probably win on a motion for summary judgment. However, the loss of the presumption of material injury would
place the senior appropriator in the almost impossible position of developing costly technical evidence.
Both 2009 rainwater harvesting statutes attempt to avoid creating a
material injury via their internal limitations.167 To address the problem of out-of-priority diversions under the prior appropriation doctrine, SB 09-080 integrates small-scale residential rainwater harvesting
into Colorado’s existing statutory and regulatory framework for
groundwater.168 By restricting rainwater harvesting to designated
groundwater basins, SB 09-080 takes advantage of the presumption
that such groundwater is not needed to fulfill surface water rights.169
This presumption is not absolute, but “the burden of proving that
groundwater within a designated basin is not designated groundwater
is on the proponent of that proposition.”170 In any effort to thwart
rainwater harvesting authorized under this statute, the burden is on
the senior appropriator claiming that captured rainwater is not designated groundwater. In addition, by linking rainwater harvesting systems to exempt wells with permits, SB 09-080 builds upon the existing
statutory presumption that the issuance of a permit reflects the State
162. Simpson v. Yale Invs., Inc., 886 P.2d 689, 697 (Colo. 1994).
163. Id. at 696.
164. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3)(a) (2016).
165. Kobobel, 249 P.3d at 1136; Buffalo Park Dev. Co. v. Mountain Mut. Reservoir
Co., 195 P.3d 674, 685 (Colo. 2008).
166. Buffalo Park Dev. Co., 195 P.3d at 684–85.
167. See supra Section IV.A.
168. See Colorado Groundwater Management Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-101
to -143 (2016).
169. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(6)(a) (2016).
170. Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 147 P.3d 20, 32 (Colo. 2006); accord
State ex rel. Danielson v. Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752, 759 (Colo. 1981).
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Engineer’s judgment that pumping from the well will not cause material injury to existing water rights.171 HB 09-1129 avoids the problem
of causing material injury by simply requiring replacement of rainwater lost to harvesting activities, subject to net depletions.172
Net depletion is not a new concept created in response to the controversy caused by rainwater harvesting. Colorado’s water regime has
recognized in other contexts that the legal obligation to augment
water used out of priority does not require full replacement. With
evaporation from gravel pit ponds, the Colorado Division of Water
Resources generally accepts a credit for evapotranspiration of 70% of
the total precipitation for non-irrigated sites due to consumption by
native plants.173 The same would hold true for rainwater harvesting
based on a 2007 study prepared for the Colorado Water Conservation
Board on rain falling in northwest Douglas County, a rapidly
suburbanizing area located in the foothills and plains west of the
Rocky Mountains between Denver and Colorado Springs.174 The
study noted that “[p]recipitation falling on undeveloped sites is consumed during the growing season (typically April through November
at this location) by native vegetation evapotranspiration processes and
is lost through evaporation and sublimation processes during the nongrowing season.”175 The average loss of water to evapotranspiration
and sublimation on undeveloped sites was 97% of the precipitation so
that only 3% of the precipitation was held as moisture in the soil or
returned to surface water or groundwater sources.176 In a wet year,
the maximum evapotranspiration and sublimation rate was 85% of the
total precipitation.177 In a dry year, 100% of the precipitation was lost
to evapotranspiration and sublimation.178 The concept of net depletion creates a buffer for rainwater harvesters, although the sublimation rate of 85% probably best represents the watered lawns of urban
and suburban homeowners along the Front Range.
HB 16-1005, Colorado’s newer and broader rainwater harvesting
statute, appears to take advantage of the interaction between net depletions, return flows, and the material injury standard. Requiring that
the water collected only be used for outdoor purposes and not indoor
purposes takes advantage of both net depletion and return flow rates
171. “If the state engineer finds that the vested water rights of others or any other
existing well will be materially injured, he shall deny the permit. Otherwise, the permit shall be issued, and it shall set forth such conditions for drilling, casing, equipping,
and using the well as are reasonably necessary to prevent waste, pollution, or material
injury to existing rights.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-602(3)(b)(I) (2016).
172. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-115(6)(c) (2016).
173. BURR, supra note 44, at 1–2 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-84-117(5), 37-80120(5), 37-92-305(12) (2010)).
174. DOUGLAS COUNTY WATER STUDY, supra note 13, at 2.
175. Id. at 21.
176. Id. at 24.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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to limit the extent of the injury.179 Supporters of rainwater harvesting
note that “collecting rainwater for later outdoor use merely alters the
timing of return flows, not the actual availability of water.”180 In addition, return flow rates are central to the idea that urbanization has
increased the extent of paved and other impermeable surfaces, resulting in more runoff and water entering into the system downstream,
which offsets the activities of rainwater harvesters.181
HB 16-1005 also attempts to minimize the extent of the injury by
restricting a rainwater harvesting system to a residential rooftop and
two rain barrels with a maximum combined capacity of 110 gallons
limits the amount collected.182 A formula for converting a residence’s
roof area into gallons of rainwater captured per year produces results
ranging from 534 gallons to over 17,000 gallons, depending on the sublimation rate.183 However, these calculations beg the question of
whether these amounts, in the aggregate, are material. A study conducted by the Urban Water Center at Colorado State University estimated a 5% adoption rate for rain barrel systems in Colorado based
on adoption rates in other states and concluded “that allowing 100
gallons of rainwater storage per household will not decrease surface
runoff by any detectible amount on a typical lot” per year.184 However, in upholding the denial of an application for surface water rights
in a designated ground water basin based on increased runoff from the
impermeable surfaces from a proposed development, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that granting the application would have harmed
senior designated ground water users by reducing the rate of aquifer
179. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-96.5-103(1)(c)–(d) & (2) (2016).
180. Kelley, supra note 92, at 120.
181. “A study conducted by the Urban Water Center at Colorado State University
. . . concluded that development on previously undeveloped (greenfield) land has a
significantly greater effect on surface runoff and infiltration than rainwater storage.”
COLO. LEGIS. COUNCIL, infra note 184, at 4.
182. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-96.5-103(1)(a) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-96.5103(1)(c) & (d) & -103(2) (2016).
183. “The formula for calculating the quantity of rain water which can be caught
from a building’s roof is: (1) to multiply the length of the roof by its width to get the
area, (2) to multiply the roof area by the inches of average annual rainfall, and (3) to
multiply that number by 0.623, which will provide the gallons of water that can be
captured annually. The result can be surprisingly large.” Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Rainwater Recapture: Development Regulations Promoting Water Conservation, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 359, 361 (2010). The average annual rainfall in Denver
between 1981 and 2010 is 14.30 inches. NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, Denver’s 2016
Climate Year In Review, http://www.weather.gov/bou/Denver_2016_CliSum [https://
permacc/74P6-V836] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017). With a roof area of 2,000 square
feet, the water collected by a single-family residence is 17,817 gallons per year, assuming the rain barrels are emptied when full. Factoring in the sublimation rate of 85%,
the amount lost is 2,672 gallons per year. With a sublimation rate of 97%, the amount
lost is reduced to 534 gallons per year.
184. COLO. LEGIS. COUNCIL, WATER RESOURCE REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 4 (Dec. 2015), http://tinyurl.com/h5ednlo [https://permacc/P3BT-6W79].
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recharge by 4%.185 Thus, even small percentage changes related to
water can result in a material injury.
The key factor becomes the presumption of material injury. Net depletion and return flow evidence along with estimates of the amount
of water captured by residential rooftop rainwater harvesting systems
will be necessary to support the rainwater harvesting activities authorized by HB 16-1005 from takings claims. Unfortunately, they may not
be sufficient if a presumption of material injury is made in favor of the
senior appropriator. However, HB 16-1005 appears to undermine the
presumption of material injury from the activities of rainwater harvesters through the authorizations given to the State Engineer. First,
the State Engineer “may curtail rain barrel usage pursuant to Section
37-92-502(2)(a).”186 The referenced section describes the material injury standard and the multi-factor test that the State Engineer must
use to determine a material injury. Incorporating the multi-factor test
into the rainwater harvesting statute indicates a need to use the test,
which would seem to negate a presumption of material injury. Second,
the State Engineer must report to the agricultural committees of each
house of the Colorado General Assembly in 2019 and 2022 on
whether residential rainwater harvesting is causing “any discernable
injury to downstream water rights.”187 The “discernable injury” standard is new, and its language indicates that it is different from the
material injury standard, which creates some confusion. A synonym
for “discernable” is “perceptible,”188 which may indicate a higher
standard if the injury has to be visible or a lower standard if the injury
just has to be noticeable. However, the discernable injury standard is
only for reporting purposes, and the material injury standard must still
be met for the State Engineer to curtail rainwater harvesting. Since
HB 16-1005 appears to address the issue of material injury and undermine the presumption of a material injury, the concepts of net depletion and return flows combined with the expense of generating
hydrological evidence should make it difficult for a senior appropriator to prevail on a taking claim, even under a per se physical takings
theory.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court refused to use a per se takings
analysis to evaluate whether a thirty-two month moratorium on new
residential development in the Lake Tahoe Basin to permit a govern185. In re Water Rights, 361 P.3d 392, 399 (Colo. 2015).
186. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-96.5-103(3) (2016).
187. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-96.5-105(1) (2016).
188. THESARUS.COM, http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/discernible (last visited
Aug. 23, 2017).
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ment agency to study impacts and make plans going forward was a
taking.189 As the Court noted:
Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential way—often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings would transform
government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.
By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual property
rights.190

However, the Court’s optimistic statement about easily identifying
physical appropriations has not been true when applied to water rights
in a prior appropriation state such as Colorado because of their nature
as use rights. Whether government regulatory interference with a
water right can be a per se taking remains unsettled and is fiercely
debated among academics and by attorneys representing different
types of water users and their interests. . Even something as seemingly
simple as rainwater harvesting raises a takings issue and adds to the
debate of whether a per se takings analysis can apply to a government
regulation that affects appropriative water rights.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, rainwater harvesters authorized by HB 16-1005 will likely be junior appropriators who are
capturing, using, and consuming water out of priority. Senior appropriators can claim that rainwater harvesting interferes with their beneficial use rights and that the enabling statutes are per se physical
takings. However, to determine if a government action constitutes a
taking, a court must first be convinced that the senior appropriator
had a cognizable property right under Colorado law. Taking advantage of the language of HB 16-1005 and the requirement that any injury to the senior appropriator’s property right must be a material
injury should allow supporters of rainwater harvesting to avoid, or at
least overcome per se physical takings claims and allow the state to
avoid paying compensation.
189. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
337 (2002).
190. Id. at 324–25.

